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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the association between the level of audit fees paid and asset 
revaluations, one use of fair value accounting. This Australian study also investigates 
attributes of asset revaluations and the association with the level of audit fees paid. We find 
that firms choosing the revaluation model incur higher audit fees than those that chose the 
cost model; asset revaluations made by directors lead to the firm incurring higher audit fees 
than for those made by external independent appraisers; and revaluation of investment 
properties leads to lower audit fees. The findings suggest that asset revaluations can result in 
higher agency costs and audit fees vary with the reliability of the revaluations and the class of 
assets being revalued.  
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1. Introduction 
This study examines one use of fair value accounting, the revaluation of assets, in 
financial statements and its association with the level of audit fees paid. As such, the results of 
this study may assist standard setters in their ongoing deliberations about the role of fair value 
reporting in general-purpose financial statements, as the results suggest that fair value 
reporting lead to an increase in the level of audit fees paid. The Schneider and Tran (2013) 
study of European IFRS banks financial statements provides evidence that audit fees increase 
with higher exposure to the number of categories of financial statements used by a bank, level 
three assets and liabilities and reclassifications of financial statements. The increase in audit 
fees is attributed to the complexity of these contexts and the lower reliability of level three 
assets  
  Asset revaluation refers to the process of remeasuring the book value of non-current assets 
to their fair market value. The practice of asset revaluations has been permitted and is 
commonly used in Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Spain, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom (UK). In the UK and Australia, firms can, but are not required to, 
revalue certain classes of long-lived assets. In addition, disclosure laws dating from at least 
1961 in Australia have required details of valuations reported in financial statements if assets 
are carried at amounts other than cost. By contrast, in many countries such as the United 
States (US), upwards asset revaluations of fixed assets are not permitted under US GAAP 
(Aboody, Barth and Kasnik, 1999). 
   A substantial body of literature has explored the association between the use of fair value 
measurement in accounting and contracting costs involved with investors, debt holders and 
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regulators (Sharpe and Walker, 1975; Standish and Ung, 1982; Brown, Izan and Loh, 1992; 
Whittred and Chan, 1992; Easton, Eddey and Harris, 1993; Cotter and Zimmer, 1995; Aboody, 
Barth and Kasznik, 1999; Danbolt and Rees, 2008). The main purpose of this study is to 
investigate the effect of asset revaluation, one use of fair value accounting, and its attributes 
upon a major contracting cost, audit fees. Since the implementation of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), fair value accounting is often the mandated 
measurement base for many assets and liabilities, giving rise to many challenges for external 
auditors and auditing standard setters (Kumarasiri and Fisher, 2011), including to what extent 
are auditors technically prepared for the challenges presented by fair value accounting? While 
prior studies generally confirm that fair value accounting provides price-relevant information 
in financial statements, the trade-off between relevance and reliability of fair value 
measurements can pose significant risks for both preparers and auditors. Thus, the particular 
research questions in this study are: (1) Do asset revaluations increase (or decrease) audit fees? 
(2) Does the choice of appraisers, internal or external, affect the level of audit fees paid? (3) 
Do the attributes of asset revaluations, such as the features of the assets being revalued, affect 
audit fees? These research questions are considered to be timely and interesting to academics, 
practitioners and regulators. 
   The findings of this study indicates that there has been a significant increase in the audit 
fees paid associated with asset revaluations, implying that revaluation of assets can lead to 
additional audit work/review or agency costs. Furthermore, there are difficulties associated 
with the variation in techniques used to ascertain fair values across different industries and 
general complexities in ascertaining fair values by auditors, thus, assessing the fair value of 
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non-current assets increases the litigation risk of auditors. It would be expected that auditors 
would charge a fee premium to reflect the higher risk exposure. Additionally, this study finds 
that an independent valuer statistically weakens the positive association between the asset 
revaluations and external audit fees. This finding is consistent with the argument that external 
independent appraisers are more credible than internal directors, reducing the assessed level 
of audit review and auditor litigation risks. An alternative explanation rests on the expertise of 
the external appraisers. External valuers may provide inputs into the audit process. Auditors 
may rely on the findings of a specialist hired by management as appropriate audit evidence 
(Muller and Riedl, 2002; Goncharov, Riedl and Sellhorn, 2012). We also find that 
revaluations of property, plant and equipment (PPE) lead to higher audit fees than 
revaluations of investment properties (IP). The findings are consistent with the attributes of 
the revaluation in terms of classification of the asset and the nature of the valuer, external or 
internal. A battery of robustness checks have been conducted including (a) using alternative 
measures of audit fees, (b) employing a lag approach to mitigate the self-selection and 
endogenous issues, (c) excluding companies from the financial industry and (d) eliminating 
the effect of adoption of IFRS in 2005. These robustness checks provide consistent results.  
    This study contributes to both the fair value accounting and audit fees literatures as 
follows. First and foremost, this study extends the literature on the association between asset 
revaluations and contracting costs. Prior research has shown mixed evidence on investors’ 
reactions to asset revaluations and demonstrates that asset revaluations do lead to less 
restrictive debt covenants, resulting in lower contracting costs and political costs (Brown et al., 
1992; Whittred and Chan, 1992；Easton et al., 1993; Cotter and Zimmer, 1995). However, the 
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results are mixed. For example, Ettredge et al. (2011) found that audit fees increased as the 
proportion of fair valued assets increase in the US banking industry using a sample of bank 
holding companies during 2006-2008. On the other hand, using a sample of European real 
estate firms after IFRS adoption, Goncharov et al. (2012) provided evidence that audit fees 
are economically and statistically lower in firms reporting higher proportions of property 
assets at fair value. The evidence is mixed due to: (1) these studies examine different 
industries, (2) the evidence is entangled along with the financial crisis, (3) the asset at fair 
value is of a single type specific in an industrial sector and (4) institutional differences exist 
(e.g. different legal enforcement and different cultures).  
This study is an attempt to fill this gap and differs from Ettredge et al. (2011) and 
Goncharov et al. (2012) by identifying a setting in which asset revaluations are an option of a 
firm and vary considerably by industries. Secondly, this study explores the attributes of asset 
revaluations in relation to the pricing of audit services which have only been investigated to a 
limited extent in prior studies. In doing so, this study will provide both managers and auditors 
with a cost-benefit view about asset revaluations. Previous studies indicate that using fair 
values reduce information asymmetries and improve decision making. However, the results of 
this study indicate that asset revaluations increase contracting costs (audit fees), suggesting 
that this salient characteristic of fair value reporting can weaken or even dominate the 
benefits.  
The results from this study may also assist standard setters in their ongoing deliberations 
about the role of fair value reporting in general-purpose financial statements, as they suggest 
that fair value reporting can enhance both the decision and contracting usefulness of financial 
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statements but also increase the level of audit fees paid. In other words, fair value accounting 
can potentially foster the objectives of financial reporting but cause additional costs for firms. 
Finally, the debate on the use of fair value in accounting has been intense since the 2008 
global financial crisis (Gartenberg and Serafeim, 2009; Laux and Leuz, 2010；Amel-Zadeh 
and Meeks, 2011). Critics argue that fair value accounting exacerbated the severity of the 
2008 financial crisis. Using an Australian context, the empirical evidence provided by this 
study contributes to these arguments.  
    The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background of 
asset revaluation in Australia. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Section 4 develops the 
hypotheses of the study. Section 5 outlines the sample, specifies the regression model and the 
variables used in the model. Section 6 presents the analysis of the results. Section 7 
summarises the robustness tests. Section 8 concludes and addresses limitations of the study. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
In Australia, the manager of a firm has discretion on the use of asset revaluation. Asset 
revaluation refers to the act of recognising a reassessment of the carrying amount of a 
non-current asset to its fair value as at a particular date. Prior to 2005, the accounting standard 
for revaluation of assets was AASB 1041 Revaluation of Non-Current Assets. Now there are 
three accounting standards, AASB 116 Property, Plant and Equipment, AASB 138 Intangible 
Assets, and AASB 140 Investment Properties.   
i) Paragraph 29 of AASB 116 states: 
An entity shall choose either the cost model in paragraph 30 or the revaluation model in 
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paragraph 31 as its accounting policy and shall apply that policy to an entire class of 
property, plant and equipment. 
    In terms of valuers, according to AASB 116, revaluations of non-current assets can be 
made on the basis of valuations made by directors or by independent valuers. Based on the 
guidance for revaluation above, managers are not indifferent to how and when they revalue 
their firm’s assets. 
   ii) Regarding the subsequent measurement of intangible assets after initial recognition, 
AASB 138 Intangible Assets states:  
“Either the cost model or revaluation model can be applied. However, the revaluation model 
can only be selected if fair values can be determined in an active market. AASB 138 notes that 
it is uncommon for an active market to exist for intangible assets. However, some 
jurisdictions may have an active market for freely transferable licences, which may provide a 
fair value for some intangible assets.”  
While most firms in Australia measure intangible assets using the cost model, a few firms 
choose the revaluation model.  
    iii) In accordance with AASB 140 Investment Properties, investment properties shall be 
measured after initial recognition using either i) the fair value model, with changes in fair 
value recognised in profit or loss in the period that they arise, or ii) the cost model, measured 
by depreciated cost less any accumulated impairment losses in accordance with AASB 116 
Property, Plant and Equipment. In addition, this standard states that investment property 
measured at fair value does not have to be depreciated and determining the fair value of an 
investment property should be (but is not required to be) undertaken by an independent 
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valuer.  
Overall, the principles of accounting for asset revaluations in Australia introduce 
substantial discretion into the revaluation process. For example, there is no specific 
requirement on the method of revaluation or of the nature of the valuer, although AASB 140 
recommends an independent valuer for investment properties. Upwards asset revaluations are 
allowed despite the concern that estimates of current market prices can lead to biased values 
in financial reports (Walker, 1992). The discretion available under the Australian standards on 
asset revaluations provide a research opportunity which is not available in the US and other 
countries. 
 
2. Literature Review 
    This study is related to two strands of literature: that examining the determinants of audit 
fees, and that examining the effects of asset revaluations, which is a part of fair value 
measurements.  
 
3.1 Audit Fees Literature: 
    Audit fees represent a major agency or contracting cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Regarding the determinants of audit fees, much research focuses on the client attributes, 
auditor attributes, and engagement attributes (Simunic, 1980; Stice, 1991; Hackenbrack and 
Knechel, 1997; Hay et al., 2006; Carson, Simnett, Soo and Wright, 2012). For example, some 
research that examines auditor pricing reactions to client risk suggests that auditors respond to 
riskier clients by increasing audit fees since higher levels of inherent risk result in higher 
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levels of audit effort to reduce detection risk (Davis et al., 1993; Bell et al., 2001; Johnstone 
and Bedard, 2001, 2004). Other research finds that higher financial reporting quality of clients 
might reduce the audit fees as it reduces the potential litigation risks (Charles, Glover and 
Sharp, 2009; Lee et al., 2012). We follow the previous research in viewing audit fees as one of 
the contracting costs (or monitoring costs) arising from the agency problems of a firm and 
exploring the association between the choice of the asset revaluation model to these 
contracting costs.    
 
3.2 Asset Revaluation Literature: 
    The impact of the accounting choice to revalue assets has been largely explored in 
relation to their contracting costs or economic consequences with the evidence mostly from 
Australia or the UK market (Standish and Ung, 1982; Easton et al., 1993; Brown et al., 1992). 
For example, several studies examine the information content of asset revaluations and 
document a positive stock market reaction to asset revaluations due to the reduced 
information asymmetry between managers and investors (Sharpe and Walker, 1975; Standish 
and Ung, 1982; Easton et al., 1993; Aboody et al., 1999; Danbolt and Rees, 2008). Other 
researchers explain that the asset revaluations are mainly shaped by incentives to improve the 
costly contracting process between a company and its claimholders. Specifically, Brown et al. 
(1992), Whittred and Chan (1992), Cotter and Zimmer (1995) use Australian data and find 
that leveraged companies in danger of violating covenants are more likely to revalue assets. In 
a survey of chief financial officers conducted by Easton et al. (1993), 40% of respondents 
explicitly indicated that revaluations are aimed at decreasing a company’s leverage and 
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loosening debt constraints.  
    Following the debates on the use of fair value in accounting since the 2008 financial 
crisis (Laux and Leuz, 2010), a few studies have drawn attention to how fair value 
measurement affects another major contracting cost, audit fees, in the banking industry and 
other industries that were severely affected by the financial crisis. For example, Ettredge, Xu 
and Yi (2011) find that audit fees increase as the proportion of fair valued assets increase in 
the US banking industry using a sample of bank holding companies during 2006-2008. 
However, using a sample of European real estate firms after IFRS adoption, Goncharov et al. 
(2012) find that audit fees are economically and statistically lower in firms reporting a higher 
proportion of property assets at fair value. The more recent study of Schneider and Tran (2013) 
study of European IFRS banks financial statements provides evidence that audit fees increase 
with higher exposure to the number of categories of financial statements used by a bank, level 
three assets and liabilities and reclassifications of financial statements. The increase in audit 
fees is attributed to the complexity of these contexts and the lower reliability of level three 
assets  
The evidence is mixed due to the fact that (1) these studies examine different industries; (2) 
the evidence is entangled along with the financial crisis; (3) the asset at fair value is of a 
single type specific in an industrial sector; and (4) institutional differences exist (e.g. different 
legal enforcement and different cultures). 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
    There are arguments on how the pricing of audit services is affected if the asset 
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revaluation model is adopted to measure assets at fair value. Critics maintain that the use of 
asset revaluations introduces higher contracting costs. For example, auditors spend more time 
in reviewing the reported figures and discussing them with directors. More record-keeping 
costs and additional audit costs might be charged because of the additional audit review 
needed (Brown et al., 1992; Loh and Tan, 2002; Missonier-Piera, 2007).  
    Another issue with asset revaluations rises from the reliability of the measurements of 
non-current assets. Revaluation of non-current assets is heavily reliant on the judgement of 
the appraisers, which may result in unintentional and intentional bias. For example, Benston 
(2008, p. 106) claimed that ‘dishonest and opportunistic CFOs and CEOs are likely to find 
fair value accounting a boon to their efforts to manipulate reported net income.’ Several 
empirical studies have evidenced deliberate managerial bias in fair value accounting (Dietrich, 
Harris and Muller, 2000; Hodder, Mayew, McAnally and Weaver, 2006; Danbolt and Rees, 
2008; Ramanna, 2008). In addition, there are difficulties associated with the variation in 
techniques used to ascertain fair values across different industries and general complexities in 
ascertaining fair values by auditors (Martin, Rich and Wilks, 2006; Kumarasiri and Fisher, 
2011). As a result, assessing the fair value of non-current assets increases the litigation risk of 
the auditor, thus a fee premium will be charged by those auditors (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 
1984; Goodwin and Trotman, 1993). 
    Others researchers argue that asset revaluations reduce audit fees by allowing auditors to 
more clearly identify and easily ascertain the underlying asset economic value. For example, 
Dietrich et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence that fair value accounting is more reliable 
than historical cost accounting since asset revaluations serve as a way of presenting the 
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financial statements in a ‘true and fair’ way. Muller, Riedl and Sellhorn (2011) document that 
information asymmetry is reduced when fair values are disclosed. Many believe that fair 
value measurement would have led regulators and other financial statement users to address 
the financial difficulties of the company’s earlier and thus greatly reduce the contracting costs 
(Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1995).  
   
According to the competing arguments, the first alternative hypotheses are as follows:  
H1 (a): There is a significant positive association between asset revaluations and audit fees. 
H1 (b): There is a significant negative association between asset revaluations and audit fees. 
 
    The independence of the appraiser will impact the reliability of asset revaluations which 
might also affect the contracting costs. The differences between internal and external valuers 
are related to both independence and expertise. External independent valuers are experienced 
and have more credibility in estimating asset values. Auditors may rely on the findings of a 
specialist hired by management as appropriate audit evidence (Muller and Riedl, 2002; 
Goncharov et al., 2012). However, inside directors in some circumstances may provide more 
reliable revaluations given their specific knowledge of the assets’ use. For example, ‘insiders’ 
are better equipped to identify the benefits that will flow from continued use and subsequent 
disposal of certain assets (Cotter and Richardson, 2002). Thus, firms will be expected to 
select external valuers to estimate the values of certain classes of non-current assets when 
directors have less specific knowledge. The reliability of asset revaluations and the impact of 
appraiser independence may provide inputs into the audit process. It is thus hypothesised that 
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audit fees will be lower for firms who hire external valuers than for those firms of which the 
non-current assets are valued by the directors.  
H2: Audit fees are lower for firms adopting asset revaluations appraised by external valuers 
than those of firms that use director valuations. 
 
  The features of the asset class under revaluation also introduce potential complexity and 
uncertainty into the auditing process regarding classification, depreciation and valuer. First, 
the classification of property, plant and equipment (PPE) is more complex than that of 
investment properties. AASB 116 Property, Plant and Equipment defines a class of PPE as a 
grouping of assets with a similar nature including land, buildings, machinery, ships, aircraft 
motor vehicles, furniture and fittings and office equipment. The method and significant 
assumptions for revaluations should be applied within a given class. By contrast, an 
investment property is defined in AASB 140 as property (land, building or part of a building, 
or both). Second, subsequent accumulated depreciation should be estimated and deducted 
from a revalued amount of PPE at the date of revaluation and the method and significant 
assumptions for depreciation should be applied within a given class. Nevertheless, investment 
property measured at fair value does not have to be depreciated in accordance with AASB 140 
Investment Properties. Third, AASB 140 recommends firms to use an independent valuer for 
revaluing investment properties whilst there is no such a prescription for PPE or intangible 
assets. AASB 140 paragraph 32 state: 
“Determining the fair value of an investment property should be (but is not required to 
be) undertaken by an independent valuer who holds a recognised professional 
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qualification and has had recent experience in the location and type of investment 
property being valued.”  
  Hence, it is predicted that PPE revaluations lead to increased audit fees as compared to the 
audit fees for revaluations of investment property.  
  H3: Audit fees are more positively related to PPE revaluations than to investment property 
revaluations. 
 
5. Research Design 
5.1 Data collection and sample description 
  Secondary data is used in this study. Specifically, the sample consists of ASX 300 listed 
firms for the five year sample period from 2003-2007. The above years have been chosen to 
observe any changes in the level of audit fees over the five year period due to environmental 
changes (e.g. adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005). For 
Australian companies that are subject to IFRS, 2005 represents a ‘transition period’ because 
of the time needed to understand the new regulation and consider the changes required. The 
years, 2003-2004, represent the period before the adoption of IFRS and as such these years 
constitute a ‘pre-adoption period’. The years, 2006-2007, are considered as the ‘post-adoption 
period’; thus these years are expected to capture the greater part of the IFRS impact on 
external audit fees. In selecting and comparing IFRS pre- and post-adoption years, it is 
expected that the above event would have some effect on the level of audit fees paid by 
Australian firms due to the transition to the new accounting standards. Also, 2008 has been 
excluded as companies were affected by the financial crisis. 
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  The Australian top 300 companies were chosen based on the S&P/ASX 300 index, which is 
a market-capitalisation weighted and float-adjusted stock market index of Australian stocks 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange from Standard & Poor's. The index incorporates 
all of the companies in the top 200, the S&P/ASX 200 index, and an additional 100 smaller 
companies, making a total of about 300 companies in the index. The companies in the index 
are reviewed quarterly by Standard & Poor's, and in this study, the ASX 300 companies were 
according to the company list as at 2011 when the asset revaluation data were collected. The 
reason why this study did not use the company list of the test periods is because the historical 
information (e.g. ASX 300 constitutes in 2005) was updated and was not publicly accessible 
once it has been updated. Thus, the ‘Top 300’ is in fact a slightly smaller number of firms in 
this study: 2003: 208; 2004: 221; 2005: 246; 2006: 252; 2007: 266 firms. Firstly, 61 
observations have been eliminated because of missing audit fee data (2003: 18; 2004: 14; 
2005: 12; 2006: 6; 2007: 11 firms). Secondly, a small number of companies are excluded 
because of missing values for either one or more variables (2003: 24; 2004: 24; 2005: 26; 
2006: 28; 2007: 31 firms). Finally, outliers are excluded at the 1% value. For testing of the 
hypotheses, the final sample consists of 973 companies. Table 1 below outlines the sample 
selection procedures. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5.2 Research Model 
The hypotheses will be tested by using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, 
extending the traditional audit fee model (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 
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1987; Craswell and Francis, 1999) to incorporate the variables of interest to this study. The 
model that is used to test hypothesis one is as follow: 
 
LogAuditfees=b0+b1Revaluationit+b2Size+b3Debt+b4Receivables+b5Inventory+b6ROA+b7Bi
g 4+b8CGS+Year_dummy + Industry _dummy +e 
 
In order to test hypothesis two, one interaction variable: Externalit* Revaluationsit is 
introduced, which aims at capturing whether those companies that have revalued their 
non-current assets will incur a lower audit fees because of employing external independent 
valuers, as compared to those firms using director valuations. 
 
LogAuditfees=b0+b1Revaluationit+b2 Externalit* Revaluationsit +b3Size+ b4Debt 
+b5Receivables+b6Inventory+b7ROA+b8Big4+b9CGS+Year_dummy+Industry_dummy +e 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Variables and Measurements 
5.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, audit fees, will be measured by the dollar amount disclosed in the 
annual report (Jubb et al., 1996; Bell, Landsman and Shackelford, 2001; Hay, Knechel and 
Ling, 2008). In addition, in order to improve the linear relationship with audit fees, the size 
measure is transformed by taking the natural logarithm of the raw data in this study (Hay et al., 
2006, p. 169).  
 
5.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
    Our main variables of interest are the adoption of asset revaluations and attributes of 
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asset revaluations shown as follows: 
Asset Revaluationsit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i revalues any assets such as 
PPE, intangible assets or investment properties in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
Externalit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i uses an external independent appraiser to 
assess the value of the non-current assets in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
Externalit* Revaluationsit is an interaction of Asset Revaluationsit and Externalit; 
PPEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i revalues PPE in year t; 
IPit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i revalues investment properties in year t; 
 
5.3.3 Control Variables 
In order to control for the firm-specific riskiness, we use seven variables to reflect factors/ 
risks that have been shown in prior research to be related to audit fees. Based on previous 
studies (Chan et al., 1993; Cameran, 2005), size is measured by the nature logarithm of total 
assets in this study. It is expected that audit fees are positively associated with auditee size. A 
number of researchers have suggested that audit fees are positively related to inherent risk 
because the audit engagement with riskier organisations will have a higher possibility of error 
(Simunic, 1980, Hay et al., 2006). Inventory and receivables are two areas cited as the most 
difficult to audit (Simunic, 1980). Two proxies for inherent risk that will be used in this study 
are inventory divided by total assets and receivables divided by total assets. It is predicted that 
there is a positive relationship between inventory ratio/ receivable ratio and external audit fees.  
Client profitability is another measure of risk because, in general, the worse the 
performance of the client organisation, the more risk will be borne by auditors, thus the higher 
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the audit fee is expected to be (Simunic 1980). The variable that is used to measure 
performance in this study is the profitability ratio (ROA). It is expected that there will be a 
negative association between ROA and external audit fees. Leverage is included in this study 
as the measure, total liabilities divided by total assets. This study has predicted a positive 
relationship between leverage and external audit fees paid by companies.  
The Big Four audit firms are regarded as having higher audit quality, and are expected to 
be able to earn higher audit fees as a result. We use a dummy variable to indicate a Big 4 firm 
audit. This study predicts a positive relationship between Big Four auditors and external audit 
fees. In addition, some industries are considered harder to audit, thus industry is another 
essential determination of audit fees (Simunic 1980; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994; Firth, 1985; 
Karim and Moizer, 1996). The industry dummy variable is included for monitoring the 
industry factor of the audit pricing model.  
Corporate governance is another determination of audit fees as effective corporate 
governance leads to a more effective control environment of the organisation. To increase the 
credibility of the findings of this study from using individual governance characteristics in the 
models, this study uses a corporate governance index. This study employs a corporate 
governance index, based on previous literature. The scoring system is based on the Horwath 
Corporate Governance Reports (2004), in which the Australia’s largest 250 companies were 
scored and rated according to their corporate governance structures and policies (Christensen, 
Kent and Goodwin, 2010).  
Six individual control variables for the corporate governance are analysed to produce 
a corporate governance score in this study, including size of the board of directors, majority 
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of board independent, duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer, presence 
of an audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination committee. These items are 
based on the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
(2010). Only size of the board of directors and board independence are continuous variables. 
The rest of the variables are dichotomous. The corporate governance index will be calculated 
as the total of corporate governance score divided by 6. This study has no prediction for a 
relationship between corporate governance and audit fees due to the mixed findings of prior 
literature. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables in the model. Panel A shows the 
descriptive statistics for all continuous variables. The mean audit fees for companies in the 
sample is $AUD 2,047,496 ranging from a minimum of $AUD 8,450 to a maximum of $AUD 
82 million. The descriptive statistics also show that the sample covers a wide range of 
companies, some very small (minimum of $AUD 1.25 million)1, some relatively large 
(maximum of $AUD 306 billion). On average, the companies in the sample had receivables 
and inventories comprising 1% and 6% of their total assets respectively. Further, on average, 
companies in the sample had total liabilities of approximately 44% of their assets. In terms of 
the profitability of these companies, on average, the ROA ratio is -2%, which indicates that 
more than 50% of companies in the sample made an accounting loss. 
                                                             
1 This study used S&P ASX 300 constitutes as at 2011. Some of the companies were small in size in 2003 and 
2004. These firms grew larger in the later years. For example, BERKELEY RESOURCES LIMITED (BKY) had a 
total asset of AUD $125,020 in 2003 and this company had a total asset of AUD $32,032,803 in 2007. 
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   Panel B shows that descriptive statistics for all dichotomous variables. Only 11.6% of the 
companies in the sample had revalued their non-current assets, which is a small proportion as 
compared to 88.4% of companies that applied the cost model to their non-current assets. 
76.8% of the companies were audited by a Big 4 audit firms during the period from 
2003-2007. In terms of corporate governance indicators, generally, companies in the sample 
appear to have a high level of corporate governance (mean of CGS=0.75). Specifically, board 
size is large enough to exercise their power diligently. However, board independence is not 
compromised by the size of the board. Three-quarters of the companies have a majority of 
independent directors on their boards and the duality of chair and CEO occurs at a 
comparatively smaller rate of 3%. In addition, the majority of companies have an audit 
committee (90.7%) and a remuneration committee (74%). Only half of the companies have a 
nomination committee (47.9%). 
  Within the companies that have revalued their non-current assets, 69.6% selected external 
valuers to estimate any one type of asset values. Panel C shows the valuer breakdowns. 28 
companies used external valuers to assess the value of PPE. However, 77 (94%) of companies 
chose to use an external valuer to value their investment properties. This is consistent with the 
recommendation outlined in AASB 140 Investment Property (Paragraph 32) that companies 
should use external independent appraisers with particular expertise to assess the market value 
of investment properties. 
[Insert Table 2] 
  Table 3 presents the description of asset revaluations by industries. The industry is 
classified based on the two-digit GICS code downloaded from Aspect Fin Analysis. The 
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assets that firms revalue include plant, property and equipment (PPE), intangible assets and 
investment properties.  
  The first column shows that 62 firms choose to revalue PPE. These firms are mostly in the 
Financials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Materials and Industrials industries. 
The second column shows that nine firms choose to revalue intangible assets. These firms are 
mostly in the Consumer Discretionary, Materials and Industrials industries. The third column 
shows that 76 firms choose to revalue investment properties. Interestingly, 69 companies in 
the Financial sector revalued their investment properties. The fourth column shows that there 
are a total of 147 firms that choose to revalue any one of the PPE, intangible assets and 
investment properties. Overall, those firms are mostly in the Financials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Materials and Industrials industries. Interestingly, no firms in the Energy, 
Telecommunication Services and Utilities industries have revalued their assets. 
[Insert Table 3] 
  Table 4 compares the mean and standard deviation of all variables from two sub-samples: 
firms that choose the revaluation model (n=138) with those companies that choose the cost 
model (n=1055). When the means of the variables from the two sub-samples are compared, it 
is observed, firstly, total assets (t-stat=5.38), debt ratio (t-stat=3.92), ROA (t-stat=3.40) and 
CGS (t-stat=4.88) of firms that choose the revaluation model are significantly higher than 
those of firms that choose the cost model. This result is consistent with the argument that 
asset revaluations can potentially reduce the profits of companies wishing to avoid political 
costs. This result is also consistent with earlier studies where larger firms and more profitable 
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companies were found to be more likely to undertake asset revaluations. Secondly, the 
inventory ratio of firms that have used the revaluation model are higher as compared to firms 
that used the cost model; however, the differences are not statistically significant 
(t-stat=1.29). Finally, there is no difference between the level of receivables of the two 
sub-samples. 
[Insert Table 4] 
6.2 Univariate tests 
6.2.1 Revaluation Models 
  Hypothesis one predicts alternatively that external audit fees will be either increasing or 
decreasing with asset revaluations. Categorisation on the revaluation model used resulted in 
136 firms being regarded as ‘Revaluation Model’ and 996 firms as ‘Cost Model’. Table 5 
summarises the results of the univariate tests of this hypothesis. The results support 
hypothesis 1(a), that audit fees are significantly higher for those firms that used the 
revaluation model as compared to those firms that used the cost model. Table 5 reveals that 
the difference between the two groups is significant in both the independent t-test (p=0.000) 
and the U-test (p=0.000). 
[Insert Table 5] 
6.2.2 Valuers 
  Hypothesis two predicts that audit fees are lower for firms adopting asset revaluations 
appraised by external valuers than those of firms that use a directors’ valuation. 
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Categorisation on asset revaluation appraisers resulted in 95 firms being regarded as ‘External 
Appraiser’ and 41 firms as ‘Director Valuation’. Table 6 summarises the results of the 
univariate tests of this hypothesis. The results support hypothesis 2, that audit fees are 
significantly lower for those firms that used external appraisers as compared to those firms 
using director valuation. Table 6 reveals that the difference between the two groups is 
significant in both the independent t-test (p=0.000) and the U-test (p=0.000). 
[Insert Table 6] 
6.2.3 Asset Types 
  Hypothesis three predicts that audit fees are more positively related to PPE revaluations 
than to investment property revaluations. Tables 7 and 8 summarise the results of the 
univariate tests of hypothesis three. The results support hypothesis 3, that audit fees are 
significantly higher for those firms that revalued their property, plant and equipment, as 
compared to those firms that revalued their investment properties. Tables 7 and 8 reveal that 
the difference between the two groups is significant in both the independent t-test (p=0.000) 
and the U-test (p=0.000). 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8] 
  Table 9 provides the correlation matrix for each of the variables in the regression model. 
The audit fee variable is significantly related to Revaluation, External Valuation, Size, 
Inventory ratio, Receivables ratio, Debt ratio, Big 4 and CGS. The Big 4 is significantly 
correlated with Size, Receivables ratio, Inventory ratio, Debt ratio, ROA and CGS, which is 
consistent with the prediction that companies with higher inherent risk and of a larger size 
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will tend to use high reputation audit firms (Big 4). As a result, the litigation risk of these 
companies will be reduced. However, from the perspective of auditors, their litigation risk 
will increase as they are going to be auditing more risky assets, such as receivables and 
inventories. Thus, auditors will charge an audit fee premium to those clients, which are 
illustrated by a significant positive correlation between audit fees and Big 4.  
[Insert Table 9] 
6.3 Regression Results 
6.3.1 Effect of adopting revaluation models on audit fees 
    The OLS regression results are reported in Table 10. Hypotheses one predicts 
alternatively that asset revaluations are associated with a higher audit fee (H1a) or a lower 
audit fee (H1b). The dependant variable is the audit fee. Revaluationit is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm chooses to revalue any of its non-current assets (e.g. PPE, intangible assets 
or investment properties). In Column (1), the results from a base model (excluding all control 
variables) are reported, supplemented with the experimental variables (asset revaluations) in 
Columns (2). Referring to the base model in Column (1), audit fees are found to be 
significantly increasing with asset revaluations (coefficient=0.241, t-stat = 8.344). 
    Introducing the experimental variable in Column (2), the result shows that the audit fees 
are positively associated with asset revaluations (coefficient =0.060, t-stat = 2.365) and are 
significant at the 5% level (p=0.018). Therefore, hypothesis 1(a) is supported. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that revaluation of assets can lead to additional audit work. 
Furthermore, there are difficulties associated with the variation in techniques used to ascertain 
fair values across different industries and general complexities in ascertaining fair values by 
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auditors, thus, assessing fair value of non-current assets increases the litigation risk of 
auditors. The auditors would charge a fee premium to reflect the higher risk that they are 
exposed to. Further, the sign of the coefficients of the control variables Size, Receivables, 
Inventory, ROA, Debt and Big 4 are consistent with expectations (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Taylor 
and Baker, 1981; Francis, 1984; Firth, 1985; Palmorose, 1986; Chan, Ezamel and Gwilliam, 
1993; Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, 2006 Liu, 2007). The results also show that there is a 
complementary association between external auditors and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (coefficient=0.132, t-stat=5.228), which is consistent with previous studies in the 
corporate governance literature (Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Hay, Knechel and Ling, 2008). 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
6.3.2 Effect of reliability of asset revaluations on audit fees 
  In order to test hypothesis two, one interaction variable: Externalit* Revaluationsit is 
introduced, which aims at capturing whether those companies that have revalued their 
non-current assets will incur a lower audit fees because of employing external independent 
valuers, as compared to those firms that used directors’ valuations. The results are presented 
in Table 10. 
    The results displayed in Table 11 indicate that companies that selected the external 
independent appraisers incurred a lower external audit fees (coefficient=-0.161, t-stat=-5.587) 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level (p=0.000). The notion behind this finding is 
consistent with the argument that external appraisers are more independent than internal 
directors, which will certainly reduce the assessed level of audit review and auditor litigation 
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risks. One alternative explanation rests on the expertise of the external appraisers. External 
valuers may provide inputs into the audit process. Auditors may rely on the findings of a 
specialist hired by management as appropriate audit evidence (Muller and Riedl, 2002; 
Goncharov et al., 2012). Thus, the audit fees are expected to be lower if external appraisers 
are used. 
[Insert Table 11] 
 
6.2.3 Effect of classification of asset revalued on audit fees2 
  Table 12 shows that the companies that had revalued their property, plant and equipment 
occurred generally higher audit fees (coefficient=0.070, t-stat=3.244), while those companies 
that revalued their investment properties had a statistically lower audit fees 
(coefficient=-0.060, t-stat=-2.547). This finding is consistent with the prediction that the 
features of asset under revaluations can also introduce potential complexity and uncertainty 
into the auditing process regarding classification, depreciation and choice of valuer. First, the 
classification of property, plant and equipment (PPE) is more complex than that of investment 
properties. Second, subsequent accumulated depreciation should be estimated and deducted 
from a revalued amount of PPE at the date of revaluation. And the method and significant 
assumptions for depreciation should be applied within a given class. Nevertheless, investment 
properties measured at fair value do not have to be depreciated in accordance with AASB 140 
Investment Properties. Third, AASB 140 recommends firms to use an independent valuer for 
revaluing investment properties whilst there is no such prescription for PPE or intangible 
                                                             
2 Due to the small sample size of revaluation of intangible assets (N=9), intangible assets are excluded from the 
analysis of hypothesis 3. 
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assets. As noticed in the earlier section, 94 % of investment properties were valued by 
external independent appraisers with expertise, this finding is somewhat indirectly supporting 
our hypothesis two, that is, employing external valuers can potentially reduce the external 
audit fees. 
[Insert Table 12] 
 
7. Robustness: 
7.1 Alternative measures of audit fees 
(a) Using the Log of the Sum of Disclosed Auditor Remuneration 
Seetharaman, Gul and Lynn (2002, p.107) state that “…The distinction between audit 
work and non-audit work may sometimes be arbitrary, especially given that U.K. company 
law allows considerable variety in the manner in which non-audit service fees are incurred 
and disclosed’. In Australia, Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) 101 
Presentation of Financial Statements and company law have almost the same mandatory 
requirements for disclosures of auditor’s remunerations. Previous studies have shown that 
knowledge spillovers were found relating to the provision of non-audit services (Simunic, 
1984; Palmrose, 1986). Cost savings may be achieved by clients either through a lower audit 
fee or through lower non-audit fees. As a result, it is expected that occasionally higher audit 
fees may be offset by lower non-audit fees, or vice versa (Seetharaman et al., 2002). For 
example, supplying audit services might enable the firm to better identify consulting 
opportunities. Or, providing non-audit services could make auditors more familiar with client 
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systems, leading to lower audit fees. Alternatively, delivering audit services could certainly 
reduce the pricing of providing non-audit services to an audit client.  
  Accordingly, regressions are re-estimated by using the logarithm of the sum of disclosed 
auditor remuneration, including both audit fees and non-audit services, as the dependent 
variable. The results are robust with respect to this alternative specification of the dependent 
variable. The coefficients for Revaluationit, Externalit* Revaluationsit, PPEit and IPit, are all 
significant at either 1% or 5% level. 
 
(b) Adding Non-Audit Fees as a Control Variable 
  Alternatively, instead of using auditor’s total remuneration as the dependent variable, 
regressions are re-estimated by adding non-audit fees as a control variable. The results are 
robust. The coefficients for Revaluationit, Externalit* Revaluationsit, PPEit and IPit, are all 
significant at either 1% or 5% level. 
 
7.2 Endogeneity issue 
    The observed association between asset revaluations and audit fees may be caused by 
omitted variables. For example, a firm in financial distress that incurred more audit costs is 
more likely to choose asset revaluations to package the value of assets. We employ a lag 
approach to deal with these self-selection issues by regressing the audit fee in year t on the 
asset revaluations in year t-1. We find the asset revaluations of the lagged period are 
consistently positively associated with audit fees (coefficient=0.047 and p = 0.061).  
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7.3 Excluding Companies from the Financial Sector  
  A common assertion made by auditors and researchers is that some industries are more 
difficult to audit than others (Simunic, 1980). For example, financial institutions have 
relatively large assets, but are generally easier to audit than companies with extensive 
inventory, receivables, or knowledge-based assets (Hay et al., 2006). 
   The companies from the financial sector have been singled out in the sensitivity tests, 
resulting in a sub-sample with 927 firm-year observations. Results show that the results 
remain consistent with the previous findings that audit fees are increasing in asset 
revaluations (coefficient=0.065, t-stat=3.439) and the result is statistically significant at 1% 
level (p=0.000). Also, the result shows that employing external appraisers certainly reduces 
the external audit fees (coefficient=-0.129, t-stat=-4.829) and the result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (p=0.000).  
 
7.4 Effect of adoption of IFRS in 2005 
    Prior literature provides evidence of audit fees being positively associated with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption because there is a transition 
period where companies are preparing financial reports in accordance with IFRS instead of 
applying previous domestic standards. Marden and Brackney (2009) suggest that, in order to 
make the most appropriate judgments and to ensure adequate compliance, accountants must 
spend more time and efforts on analysing business transactions under IFRS. In addition, 
accounting firms are expected to make more investment in resources to enhance audit quality 
in response to the implementation of new standards, leading to higher audit fees charged by 
audit firms. On the other hand, principles-based accounting standards can lead to judgments 
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of accountants that are vulnerable to challenge. For instance, the litigation risk faced by 
accountants will be higher when their clients mismanage their business (Love and Eickemeyer, 
2009). As Hey et al. (2006) suggest, one of the factors determining audit fees is litigation risk. 
Thus, it is expected that a higher audit premium will be charged by accounting firms to 
compensate for the increased litigation risk.  
   Additionally, the transition to accounting standards under an IFRS regime has increased 
the level of audit complexity as several revisions have been made on previous Australian 
accounting standards. For example, there is a wider application of fair value accounting under 
IFRS, which results in more subjective estimates and valuations from financial reports 
preparers. Because of the considerable changes in accounting rules in a short transition period, 
it is expected that misreporting becomes more likely. Hence, the overall auditor litigation risk 
becomes higher. Moreover, the mandatory re-classification and revaluation also increase the 
degree of audit complexity. As a result, audit firms will charge a higher audit premium to 
compensate for the additional audit costs incurred after the adoption of IFRS in Australia. 
   Accordingly, sensitivity tests explore the ‘net effect’ of asset revaluations rather than the 
adoption of IFRS on audit fees. All hypotheses are re-tested by excluding the companies in 
2005 (IFRS adoption year) to avoid capturing the increased audit effort due to the 
implementation of a new accounting framework. After excluding the companies in 2005, the 
result consistently shows that there is a significant positive association between asset 
revaluations and audit fees (coefficient=0.037, t-stat=2.696) and external valuation 
statistically reduces the external audit fees (coefficient=-0.165, t-stat=-4.840). Results are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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8. Summary and Conclusion 
    The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of asset revaluations and its 
attributes upon audit fees in the Australian context. Using a sample of 300 ASX listed 
companies from the period of 2003-2007, we find that there is a significant and positive 
association between asset revaluations and audit fees. In addition, companies employing an 
independent appraiser to estimate the asset values incurred a significant lower cost of audit 
fees as compared to those companies using internal directors’ valuations. In contrast to 
investment property revaluations, PPE revaluations incurred more audit fees. Several 
sensitivity tests are conducted and the main findings remain unchanged. 
    The results of this study have important implications to standard setters on both fair 
value accounting and audit services. While the use of fair value accounting increases “true 
and fair” disclosure, it may also increase reviewing costs on value estimation and litigation 
costs to auditors. In addition, reliability of revaluations and the attributes of assets being 
revalued may introduce/reduce costs incurred in the auditing process.  
   This study has some limitations. For example, we only focus on ASX 300 firms which are 
larger and have better performance than smaller firms. As such, there is a concern about the 
relatively small sample of firms which choose asset revaluations (N=138). In addition, the 
empirical results in the study are limited to the Australian market. The results of this study 
might not be generalisable to other countries as country-differences exist. Future research can 
explore other attributes of asset revaluation upon audit pricing.  
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Appendix 1: Measurement of Variables 
Variable Measurement 
Audit fees Natural log of external audit fees 
 
Revaluationsit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i 
revalues assets such as PPE, intangible 
assets or investment properties in year t  
 
PPEit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i 
revalues PPE in year t 
 
IPit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i 
revalues investment properties in year t 
 
 
Externalit* Revaluationsit 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i uses 
external independent appraisers to assess 
the value of the non-current assets in year 
t, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Size Natural log of total assets 
 
Debt Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
 
Receivables Ratio of receivables to total assets 
 
Inventory Ratio of inventory to total assets 
 
ROA Return on assets (earnings before interest 
and tax divided by total assets) 
 
Big4 Dummy variable given the value 1 when 
a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise 
 
Industry_dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
in the Financial sector, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Year_dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
in the IFRS post-adoption period, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Corporate Governance Score Average of 6 individual corporate 
governance variables 
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Appendix 2: Components of Corporate Governance Index (ASX Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 2010) 
 
 Recommendation 
Structure the board to add value  
Companies should have a board of an effective composition, size 
and commitment to adequately discharge its responsibilities and 
duties. 
 
 Board Size 
 Board Independence: A majority of the board should be 
independent directors. 
 Duality: The roles of chair and chief executive officer 
should not be exercised by the same individual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
 
2.3 
Existence of committees  
 Audit Committee: The board should establish an 
audit committee. 
 Nomination Committee: The board should 
establish a nomination committee. 
 Remuneration Committee: The board should 
establish a remuneration committee. 
4.1 
 
2.4 
 
8.1 
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Appendix 3: Variables for Constructing the Corporate Governance Score 
 
 Corporate Governance 
Characteristic 
Details Score Details Score 
1 Size of the board of directors >5 1 =<5 0 
2 Majority of board independent >0.5 1 =<0.5 0 
3 Duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer No 1 Yes 0 
4 Presence of an audit committee Yes 1 No 0 
5 Presence of a remuneration committee Yes 1 No 0 
6 Presence of a nomination committee Yes 1 No 0 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance Score (CGS) = the average of 6 individual corporate 
governance characteristics 
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Table 1 
Sample selection procedures 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Original observations 208  221 246 252 266 1193 
Less:       
1. Missing audit fee data 18 14 12 6 11 61 
2. Missing financial data 
 24 24 26 28 31 133 
3. 1% top and bottom extreme values/ 
outliers 
 
26 
Final Sample 973 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
Panel A:Continuous Variables  
  N Minimum 
 
Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Audit Fees ($000s) 1132 8.45  82000.00  2047.50 8662.10 
Total Assets ($M) 1169 1.25  305995.00 8923.58 38797.20 
Debt  1193 0.01  1.43  0.44 0.27 
Receivables  1062 0.00  0.43  0.01  0.04  
Inventory 1048 0.00  0.54  0.06  0.10  
ROA 
CGS 
1193 
1170 
-1.44 
0.17 
0.33 
1.00 
-0.02 
0.75 
0.28 
0.24 
 
Panel C: Valuer Breakdowns 
Asset type: External appraiser Director Valuation 
Property,plant and equipment 28 34 
Intangible assets 3 6 
Investment property 77 5 
In Panel A, Audit fees are measured in thousands and total assets are measured in millions. The debt ratio is 
defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. The receivable ratio is defined as total receivables over total 
assets. The inventory ratio is defined as total inventory divided by total assets. ROA is equal to earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) divided by total assets. Panel B describes the variables used to construct the corporate 
governance score. Panel C provides the valuer breakdowns by asset types. 
 
 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables 
Variable: N Yes % No % 
Fair-value Model 1193 138 11.6 1055  88.4 
Director Valuation 138 42 30.4 96 69.6 
Big 4 1141 916 76.8 225 18.9 
Board Size>5 1093 701 58.8 492 41.2 
Board Independence > .5 1171 887 74.4 284 23.8 
CEO/Chairperson duality 1193 36 3.0 1157 97.0 
Existence of an audit committee 1193 1082 90.7 111 9.3 
Existence of a remuneration committee 1193 883 74.0 310 26.0 
Existence of a nomination committee 1193 572 47.9 621 52.1 
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Table 3 
Sample Companies by Industries using the Two-digit GICS Code 
 
 
    
Revaluation of assets 
2-digit 
GICS 
Industry N PPE(1) Intangible 
Assets(2) 
Investment 
Property(3) 
All 
Assets(4) 
10 Energy 119 0 0 0 0 
15 Materials 303 7 3 2 12 
20 Industrials 184 7 4 2 13 
25 Consumer 
Discretionary 
128 11 2 3 16 
30 Consumer Staples 43 8 0 0 8 
35 Health Care 63 3 0 0 3 
40 Financials 172 24 0 69 93 
45 Information 
Technology 
21 2 0 0 2 
50 Telecommunication 
Services 
25 0 0 0 0 
55 Utilities 34 0 0 0 0 
Total  1092 62 9 76 147 
Table 3 describes asset revaluation across industries based on the two-digit GICS code. The assets that firm 
revalues include PPE, intangible assets and investment properties. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics (Independent T-Test) 
 
  Fair-value Model 
 N=138 
Cost Model 
 N=1055 
    
 Mean SD Mean  SD Mean 
Difference 
T-stat 
Total Assets 
($M) 
25427.36  70769.07  6714.54  31612.79  18712.82  5.38* 
Receivables 
 
0.01  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.00  -0.34  
Inventory 
 
0.07  0.07  0.06  0.10  0.01  1.29  
Debt 0.52 0.22 0.43  0.28  0.09  3.92* 
ROA 0.06  0.05  -0.03  0.30  0.09  3.40*  
CGS 0.85 0.18 0.74 0.25 0.11 4.88* 
Table 4 presents the mean and median of all variables in a sub-sample of firms that chooses the revaluation 
model and a sub-sample of firms that chooses the cost model. The debt ratio is defined as total liabilities divided 
by total assets. The receivable ratio is defined as total receivables divided by total assets. The inventory ratio is 
defined as total inventory divided by total assets. ROA is equal to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
divided by total assets. CGS is an average of 6 individual corporate governance variables. **=significant at the 
5% level (two-tailed test),*=significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 5 
Revaluation Models (cost model versus revaluation model) for Firms in Relation to 
External Audit Fees 
 
Dependent Variable Revaluation Model 
 Cost model      Revaluation 
model 
 
 n 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
n 
Mean 
(Std Dev)  
 
Significance 
   T-test 
 
U-test 
 
External audit fees 
 
 
 
*Two-tailed probabilities 
 
996 
5.38 
(0.80) 
136 
5.98 
(0.68) 
 
8.344 
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
 
38662.00 
 
 
(0.000)*  
 
 
Table 6 
Appraisers (external appraisers versus director valuation) of Firms in Relation to 
External Audit Fees 
 
Dependent Variable Appraiser 
 External 
appraiser      
Director 
valuation 
 
 n 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
n 
Mean 
(Std Dev)  
 
Significance 
   T-test 
 
U-test 
 
External audit fees 
 
 
 
* Two-tailed probabilities 
 
95 
5.72 
(0.59) 
41 
6.58 
(0.47) 
 
-8.920 
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
 
38662.00 
 
 
(0.000)*  
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Table 7 
Effects of Revaluation of PPEs on External Audit Fees 
 
Dependent Variable Property, Plant and Equipment 
 Cost 
Model      
Revaluation 
model 
 
 n 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
n 
Mean 
(Std Dev)  
 
Significance 
   T-test 
 
U-test 
 
External audit fees 
 
 
 
* Two-tailed probabilities 
 
809 
5.44 
(0.79) 
61 
6.23 
(0.63) 
 
9.344 
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
 
10645.50 
 
 
(0.000)*  
 
 
Table 8 
Effects of Revaluation of Investment Properties on External Audit Fees 
 
Dependent Variable Investment Property 
 Cost model      Revaluation 
model 
 
 n 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
n 
Mean 
(Std Dev)  
 
Significance 
   T-test 
 
U-test 
 
External audit fees 
 
 
 
* Two-tailed probabilities 
 
775 
5.41 
(0.79) 
80 
5.88 
(0.69) 
 
5.106 
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
 
20380.50 
 
 
(0.000)*  
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Table 9 
Correlation Matrix between Variables 
 
Variable Audit Fees Revaluation Valuer Size Receivables Inventory ROA Debt Big 4 GCS 
Audit Fees 1                   
Revaluation .241** 1                 
Valuer .101** .818** 1               
Size .791** .276** .177** 1             
Receivables .070* -.006 -.019 .029 1           
Inventory .241** .030 .007 .175** -.029 1         
ROA .292** .098** .081** .451** .037 .209** 1       
Debt .457** .113** .047 .593** .103** .240** .199** 1     
Big 4 .517** .149** .109** .545** .096** .186** .303** .292** 1   
GCS .609** .141** .073* .593** .024 .239** .259** .353** .480** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Audit fees = natural log of external audit fees; Revaluation= dummy variable equal to 1 if firm I revalues any of 
its non-current assets in year t; Valuer= Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i uses the external independent 
appraisers to assess the value of the non-current assets in year t, and 0 otherwise; Size = natural log of total 
assets; Receivables = ratio of receivables to total assets; Inventory = ratio of inventory to total assets; ROA = 
return on assets (earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets); Debt = ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets; Big 4 = a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise. CGS= 
self-constructed corporate governance score. 
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Table 10 
Results from Regression of Audit Fees on Asset Revaluations 
 
LogAuditfees=b0+b1Revaluationit+b2Size+b3Debt+b4Receivables+b5Inventory+b6ROA+b7Bi
g 4+b8CGS+Year_dummy + Industry _dummy +e 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Colum (1) 
Base Model 
Colum (2) 
Revaluation Model 
  Coefficient 
 
t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept  5.382 216.551* 0.495 
 
2.983** 
Revaluationit +/- 0.241 8.344* 0.060 
 
2.365** 
Size +   0.663 
 
21.804* 
Debt +   0.044 
 
1.877 
Receivables +   0.040 
 
2.200** 
Inventory +   0.052 
 
2.797* 
ROA -   -0.085 
 
-3.843* 
Big 4 +   0.087 
 
3.869* 
CGS 
 
+/-   0.132 5.228* 
Year Dummy 
 
?   Included  
Industry Dummy 
 
?   Included  
Adjusted R2  5.7%  68.7%  
N  1131  973  
Audit fees = natural log of external audit fees; Revaluation= dummy variable equal to 1 if firm I revalues any of 
its non-current assets in year t; Size = natural log of total assets; Debt = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
Receivables = ratio of receivables to total assets; Inventory = ratio of inventory to total assets; ROA = return on 
assets (earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets); Big4 = a dummy variable given the value 1 when 
a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise. CGS= self-constructed corporate governance score. Industry_Dummy = 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the Financials, and 0 otherwise. **=significant at the 5% level 
(two-tailed test),*=significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
 
47 
 
Table 11 
Results from Regression of Audit Fees on External Valuation 
 
LogAuditfees=b0+b1Revaluationit+b2 Externalit* Revaluationsit +b3size+ b4debt 
+b5receivables+b6inventory+b7roa+b8big4+b9CGS+Year_dummy+Industry_dummy +e 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Colum (1) 
Base Model 
Colum (2) 
Revaluation Model 
  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept  5.382 219.773* 0.489 
 
2.993* 
Revaluationit +/- 0.481 9.695* 0.169 
 
5.844* 
Externalit* 
Revaluationsit 
 
- -0.293 -5.906* -0.161 
 
-5.587* 
Size +   0.666 
 
22.240* 
Debt +   0.049 
 
2.098** 
Receivables +   0.050 
 
2.772* 
Inventory +   0.074 
 
3.658* 
ROA -   -0.084 
 
-3.877* 
Big 4 +   0.084 
 
3.780* 
CGS 
 
+/-   0.125 5.026* 
Year Dummy 
 
?   Included  
Industry Dummy 
 
?   Included  
Adjusted R2  8.5%  69.7%  
N  1131  973  
Audit fees = natural log of external audit fees; Revaluation= dummy variable equal to 1 if firm I revalues any of 
its non-current assets in year t; Externalit* Revaluationsit = Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i uses external 
independent appraisers to assess the value of the non-current assets in year t, and 0 otherwise;Size = natural log 
of total assets; Debt = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Receivables = ratio of receivables to total assets; 
Inventory = ratio of inventory to total assets; ROA = return on assets (earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets); Big4 = a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise. CGS= 
self-constructed corporate governance score. Industry_Dummy = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in 
the Financials, and 0 otherwise. **=significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test),*=significant at the 0.10 level 
(two-tailed test). 
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Table 12 
Results from Regression of Audit Fees on Two Types of Non-current Assets 
 
LogAuditfees=b0+b1PPEit(/orIPit)+b2Size+b3Debt+b4Receivables+b5Inventory+ 
b6ROA+b7Big 4+b8CGS+Year_dummy + Industry _dummy +e 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Column(1): 
PPE 
 
Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
t-stat 
Column(2) : 
Investment 
property 
Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
t-stat 
Intercept  0.571 
 
2.934* 0.521 
 
2.622* 
PPEit/orIPit +/- 0.070 
 
3.244* -0.060 
 
-2.547* 
Size + 0.632 
 
18.270* 0.654 
 
18.155* 
Debt + 0.030 
 
1.035 0.041 
 
1.413 
Receivables + 0.043 
 
2.015** 0.046 
 
2.119** 
Inventory + 0.069 
 
2.943** 0.071 
 
2.944* 
ROA - -0.088 
 
-3.465* -0.092 
 
-3.523* 
Big 4 + 0.097 
 
3.809* 0.089 
 
3.399* 
CGS +/- 0.147 5.164* 0.142 4.867* 
      
Year_Dummy 
 
? Included  Included  
Industry_Dummy ? Included  Included  
Adjusted R2  66.6%  66.5%  
N  789  757  
Audit fees = natural log of external audit fees; PPEit= Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i revalues PPE in 
year t; IPit= Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i revalues investment properties in year t; Size = natural log 
of total assets; Debt = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Receivables = ratio of receivables to total assets; 
Inventory = ratio of inventory to total assets; ROA = return on assets (earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets); Big 4 = a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise. CGS= 
self-constructed corporate governance score. Industry_Dummy = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the 
Financial sector, and 0 otherwise. Year_Dummy= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the IFRS 
Post-adoption period, and 0 otherwise. 
**=significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test),*=significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test). 
